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Korth should have been fired for not disqualifying himself in the TFX award. The more facts we learn, the more it becomes clear that there was a conflict of interest.

His TFX role was grounds for firing him. His activity in this insurance deal, in which he voted approval of the transactions with Ben Jack Cage should have been grounds for firing him.

Korth's correspondence on Navy stationery to promote his bank's business was grounds for firing him.

If the Justice Department did not clear Korth, then the Attorney General should state that this is so in a loud and clear voice, and let it be known that Korth was wrong and his pattern of activity will not be tolerated.

The pattern of coverup we have been treated to in the Korth affair does not stimulate the belief that there is a proper atmosphere to promote honest government.

First. The atomic carrier story was a phoney "cover story" to mislead the public on the reason for Korth's resignation.

Second. We were told that Korth's resignation had nothing to do with TFX. This was someone's cute and clever way of misleading the public into believing that the McClellan Investigating Subcommittee's work had nothing to do with Korth's resignation. Now it is becoming clear that the letters uncovered by the McClellan staff were at the bottom of the forced resignation. Even this is an effort to avoid admission that Korth's conflict of interest involved, for that might contaminate the whole TFX contract and force reconsideration.

Third. Korth now says that no one asked him to resign. This is another bit of wording that is intended to mislead the press and the public into believing that top officials of the Kennedy administration have absolved Korth of wrongdoing. I do not think he would be resigning if the top officials were so convinced he was not at least indiscreet.

It is time for the administration to end this doubletalk and this coverup. It is time to quit shielding Korth and others involved in the mismanagement and the misdoings in the TFX warplane contract. It is time for the President to take a forthright stand for strong steps to clean up this TFX mess.

THE BUCKET ARGUMENT

(Mr. HALL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include an editorial.)

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, Members of the House will recall that I did my utmost during the recent debate on the foreign aid authorization bill to attach an amendment which would limit our contributions to United Nations Assistant Agencies to not more than 33 1/2% of the total budgets of those agencies. This is the same limitation now applicable by law to the Federal United Nations Budget and our contributions thereto.

The Wall Street Journal reports that the United Nations Special Fund now seeks a \$28 million boost in its budget for 1964. This would be more than a

third greater than the 1963 budget and we already contribute 40 percent of the United Nations Special Funds budget. It appears that while we are finally tightening up our foreign aid budget, we are losing our savings through the back door to the United Nations aid program. I urge the Members of the House to read the following editorial from the Wall Street Journal.

THE BUCKET ARGUMENT

The United Nations Special Fund, an outfit that provides technical assistance to underdeveloped nations, is seeking a \$28 million boost in its budget for 1964.

In case anyone thinks this a bit steep—it would be up more than a third from 1963—the Fund's managing director, Paul G. Hoffman, implies that it's a drop in the bucket compared with the \$120 billion U.N. members will spend on defense this year.

A number of questions can be raised about this whole Special Fund undertaking, or at least the heavy U.S. support of it. The United States after all runs an extremely expensive foreign aid program of its own. And some of the U.N. Special Fund money has gone to peculiar places like Communist Cuba.

Apart from all that, what interests us is this drop-in-the-bucket argument, which is getting so familiar in so many areas. We are constantly told for example that the outlay for books or concerts or whatever is only a drop in the bucket compared with national spending on liquor and cigarettes, just as though there were some relevant connection.

Or that the Government foreign aid program is only a drop in the total budget. Or for an intriguing variation, that the public debt, which is rapidly rising, is actually getting smaller as a percentage of gross national product or something. Or, for a further variation, that a particular pork-barrel project costs hardly anything—the first year, that is.

Somewhat the bucket-arguers never seem to reflect on the sororus. That all those drops quickly became raging oceans of spending and, in the cases of the United States and the U.N., red ink.

CUBA

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LIBONATI). Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Montana (Mr. BATTIN) is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. BATTIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.

Mr. BATTIN. Mr. Speaker, today is an anniversary—the anniversary of the President's address to the Nation announcing that there were indeed missile sites in Cuba. In this speech the President announced his intention to impose a partial blockade—which he called a quarantine—to prevent the arrival of further offensive military equipment in Cuba.

Last Saturday, recalling the events of the crisis of October 1962, the President declared that the outcome of that crisis could not be considered either "a victory in the usual military sense" or a defeat. He left the Nation in considerable doubt as to just what the outcome should be considered.

The results are indeed difficult to assess. If one does not limit himself to the events of the week of October 22, 1962, but looks at these events in the broader context of the events that pre-

ceded and the events that followed the week of the missile crisis, one is in a better position to judge whether the Soviet Union or the United States obtained a net advantage. In this larger context, the Soviet Union has scored a victory by establishing in this hemisphere a substantial military base, whether that base is at present equipped with missiles or not. Khrushchev has successfully defied the historic policy of the United States, the Monroe Doctrine, by political and military intervention in this hemisphere. Khrushchev has done what Adolf Hitler was forbidden to do by Franklin D. Roosevelt—Khrushchev has done what no foreign power was permitted to do in the past 100 years.

The massive Soviet military buildup began in the summer of 1962. This fact has been admitted by the administration itself. In a statement of the Special Committee on Communist Subversion of the OAS—a committee which included the former American Ambassador to the Organization, Mr. deLesseps S. Morrison, we read:

The military intervention of the Soviet Union in this hemisphere began to assume important proportions with the arrival in Cuba, in the middle of July 1962, of large shipments of Soviet war materials and military personnel. This fact introduced a new and dangerous element into the extracontinental intervention, which until then had primarily consisted of political and economic penetration.

A formidable military force exists in Cuba today, and as long as that force is there it is idle to deny that Khrushchev has scored a victory.

Let us look at the other aspects of the missile crisis. The President declared in his speech of October 22, 1962:

Our goal is not the victory of might, but the vindication of right—not peace at the expense of freedom, but both peace and freedom, here in this hemisphere, and, we hope, around the world. God willing, that goal will be achieved.

It is quite obvious that we have not achieved the goal which the President laid down—freedom has not been brought to Cuba. Using the standard that the President himself laid down in his speech 1 year ago, again we are forced to conclude that the outcome of the missile crisis was not victory for the United States.

Again in his speech 1 year ago, the President called for "the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of U.N. observers, before the quarantine can be lifted." In his correspondence with Khrushchev the President insisted on some form of onsite inspection, but the quarantine was lifted without securing the inspection which the President had told the world he was demanding. This retreat cannot be considered a victory for the United States.

No one can be sure whether Soviet missiles remain in Cuba. The Senate Preparedness Subcommittee has said:

Strategic weapons may or may not be now in Cuba. We can reach no conclusion on this because of the lack of conclusive evidence.

Ironclad assurance of the complete absence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba